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Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law:
The Liability Imposed
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will review the history of the Clean Streams Law,
a law aimed at controlling or abating water pollution. The legisla-
tive enactment and amendments to the law will be discussed along
with the Pennsylvania court's application and interpretation of the
law. The focus of this Comment is upon section three of the law,
entitled "Industrial Waste," with emphasis placed on the circum-
stances in which liability arises. Water pollution, in this section,
has been divided into three categories: industrial waste, mining
discharges and sewage. Cases involving the first two categories will
be examined. Legislative changes and judicial interpretation have
expanded the scope of the Clean Streams Law.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1905, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Purity of Wa-
ters Act' which addressed the problem of water pollution as it af-
fected public health. The Act regulated sewage discharge into the
waters of the Commonwealth, but specifically excluded discharges
from coal mines and tanneries.2 Two rationales were suggested for
the exemptions: First, that the Pennsylvania coal industry held a
powerful influence over the lawmakers of the day and, second, that
the extent of the harm caused by mine drainage was unknown at
the time.
3
In 1937, The Clean Streams Law4 supplanted the Purity of the
Waters Act as the water pollution legislation for Pennsylvania. The
General Assembly broadened the scope of water pollution control
1. Act of Apr. 22, 1905, Act No. 182, § §1-11, 1905 Pa. P.L. 60 (repealed 1937).
2. Section 4 of the Purity of Waters Act stated:
No person, corporation, or municipality shall place, or permit to be placed, or dis-
charge, or permit to flow into any of the waters of the State. . . . But this act shall
not apply to waters pumped or flowing from coal mines or tanneries...
§ 4, Pa. P.L. 260 (repealed 1937).
3. Daniel E. Rogers, Acid Coal Mine Drainage - The Perpetual Treatment Problem,
1 EASTERN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, ANN. 1980 6-1, § 6.05 at 6-9 n. 3 (1980).
4. Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 691.1-.1001
(Purdon Supp. 1989).
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by declaring a public nuisance the discharge of sewage, industrial
wastes or any other noxious deleterious substances into the Comm-
monwealth's waters. The underlying policy was protection of the
"clean waters" of the state; that is, those waters which were unpol-
luted and free from any industrial waste discharge.' Conversely,
those streams which were already polluted by this time could con-
tinue to be polluted.7 Acid mine drainage and silt from coal mines
were specifically exempted from the provisions of the law by sec-
tion 310.8
The Sanitary Water Board was established as the regulatory
agency overseeing sewage and industrial waste permits. The board
was empowered to modify or revoke permits9 and to investigate all
sources of water pollution.'" A violator of the Clean Streams Law
could be fined or imprisoned, upon conviction, of creating a public
nuisance in a summary proceeding."
In 1945, the legislature amended the Clean Streams Law. For
the first time, the Sanitary Water Board could regulate mine
drainage, as it was included in the definition of industrial waste.'2
Through the addition of section 313, the mine operator had to for-
mulate a plan for the control of any acid mine drainage and had to
implement this plan while operating his mine.' 3 The Clean
5. Id. Art. I, § 3 declared:
Discharge of sewage and Industrial Wastes Not a Natural Use.-The discharge of
sewage or industrial waste of any other noxious and deleterious substances into the
waters of the Commonwealth, which is or may become inimical and injurious to the
public health, or to animal or aquatic life, or to the users of such waters for domestic
or industrial consumption, or for recreation, is hereby declared not to be a reasonable
or natural use of such waters, to be against public policy and to be a public nuisance.
6. Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 691.1-
.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
7. Broughton, Koza & Selway, Acid Mine Drainage and the Pennsylvania Courts, 11
DuQ. L. REV. 495, 505-06 (1973).
8. Section 310 provided:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to acid mine drainage and silt from coal mines
until such time as, in the opinion of the Sanitary Water Board, practical means for the




12. Section 1 - Definitions:
"Industrial Waste" shall be construed to be any liquid, gaseous or solid substance,
not sewage, resulting from any manufacturing or industry, or from any establish-
ment, as herein defined, which causes pollution, as hereinafter defined, and silt,
coal mine solids, rock, debris, dirt and clay from coal mines, coal colleries, breakers




Streams Law still maintained the distinction between "clean wa-
ters" that were subject to regulation and the private or unclear wa-
ters which were exempt from the provisions of the law.1 ' Further
indication of the General Assembly's intent to abate water pollu-
tion could be found by the inclusion of section 311, which author-
ized the Board to purchase polluted tributaries with state funds
and to divert their courses from clean waters.15
After legislative findings that the Clean Streams Law had failed
to prevent water quality deterioration and declaring that the eco-
nomic future of Pennsylvania was at stake, the General Assembly
revamped the law in 1965.16 The lawmakers embarked upon a new
policy of reclamation of the polluted streams coupled with in-
creased prevention of further pollution.1" Sections 310 through 313
14. Section 310 exempting acid mine drainage was amended to read:
It shall be unlawful and a nuisance to discharge, or to permit the discharge, of acid
mine drainage (1) into "clean waters" of the Commonwealth which are being devoted
or put to public use at the time of such discharge; or (2) into "clean waters" of the
Commonwealth, unless the Commonwealth, after the Sanitary Water Board has ap-
proved plans of drainage pursuant to § 313 thereof ..
Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 691.1-.1001 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989).
15. Section 311 - authorized the purchase. Section 312 - authorized the diversion clean
waters.
16. 1965 Amend. § 4. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, Pa. P.L. 372, as amended, PA STAT. ANN.
tit. 35 §§ 691.1-.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1989, amending Act of June, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
Section 4:
Findings and Declarations of Policy.-It is hereby determined by the General Assem-
ble of Pennsylvania and declared as a matter of legislative findings that:
(1) The Clean Streams Law as presently written has failed to prevent an in-
crease in the miles of polluted water in Pennsylvania.
(2) The Present Clean Streams Law contains special provisions for mine drain-
age that discriminates against the public interest.
(3) Mine drainage is the major cause of stream pollution in Pennsylvania and
is doing immense damage to the waters of the Commonwealth.
(4) Pennsylvania, having more miles of water polluted by mine drainage than
any state in the nation, has an intolerable situation which seriously jeopardizes
the economic future of the Commonwealth.
(5) Clean, unpolluted streams are absolutely essential if Pennsylvania is to at-
tract new manufacturing industries and to develop Pennsylvania's full share of
the tourist industry; and
(6) Clean, unpolluted water is absolutely essential if Pennsylvanians are to
have adequate out of door recreational facilities in the decades ahead.
17. Section 4 continues:
The General Assembly of Pennsylvania therefore declares it to be the policy of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that:
(1) It is the objective of the Clean Streams Law not only to prevent further
pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth, but also to reclaim and restore
to a clean, unpolluted condition every stream in Pennsylvania that is presently
polluted, and
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were repealed, thus, eliminating the special exemption for acid
mine drainage. Acid mine drainage was now subject to section 307,
which outlawed the discharge of pollution into dirty waters. A tri-
furcated section 315 establishing a permit procedure run by the
Sanitary Water Board for mining operations was added. Section
315(a) required a drainage plan be filed with and approved by the
board; section 315(b) outlawed the 6Peration of a mine without a
permit and detailed a procedure upon which the board would issue
permits; and, section 315(c) granted the board additional powers to
revoke, suspend, or modify permits in addition to any other penal-
ties the board may impose.18
Section 316 declared the duty of a landowner or occupier to
grant access to a Water Board member upon a finding that a pol-
luting condition existed upon the land. The board member was
empowered to take necessary action to eliminate the pollution.19
Section 317 stated a violation of sections 315 and 316 is a misde-
meanor, subjecting the violator, upon conviction, to fines and im-
prisonment.20 Section 605 established a Clean Water Fund, con-
sisting of fines paid by violators to abate the cost of fighting water
pollution.21
The 1970 amendments strengthened the Clean Streams Law
and, in particular, sections 315 and 316. Section 315 clarified what
the legistature meant by "operation of a mine. ' 2 2 Mining opera-
tions included any preparatory work done to open or reopen a
mine, the closing procedures, and "any other work done on land or
water in connection with a mine. '23 Bond posting requirements
were established for mining operations. Under the amended sec-
tion 316 the Sanitary Water Board only had to find a "danger of
pollution" on the land to institute action.24 In addition, the board
could either order the landowner to correct the condition himself
or order access be given to a state agency to correct the condition.25
By 1980, the Department of Environmental Resources (hereinafter
(2) The prevention and elimination of water pollution is recognized as being
directly related to the economic future of the Commonwealth.
18. Act of Aug 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§
691.315(a)-(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
19. Id. § 691.316, amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1989.
20. Id. § 691.317, amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1989.
21. Id. § 691.605, amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1989.
22. Id. § 691.315, amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1989.
23. Id.




DER) had assumed the functions of the Sanitary Water Board. 6
Section 315 was broadened. Section 315(a) included refuse disposal
in its definition of an operation of a mine. Subsection (b) required
a mine operator to post a bond along with a guarantee of his com-
pany's creditworthiness to insure compliance with the permit. For-
feiture of the bond could result for post-mining discharges due to
improper restoration measures. Section 315(c) required a hydrolog-
ical study to be incorporated in the permit application.2 7 Subsec-
tions (d) through (o) further detailed the permit procedures. Sec-
tion 315(i) listed four situations in which the DER could designate
an area as unsuitable for mining.28 Subsection (m) gave standing to
persons having an interest in or who may be adversely affected to
petition the DER to have an area declared unsuitable for mining.29
By these amendments, it is clear that mining had lost its favored
status under the law. The regulations regarding the application
and issuance of permits placed more duties upon the mine opera-
tor. Heavier fines and penalties for noncompliance were author-
ized. Through the amendments to the Clean Streams Law the state
developed a thorough plan to deal with water pollution.
III. ACID MINE DRAINAGE
In order to fully appreciate the impact of the clean stream law
upon the coal mining industry, an understanding of what consti-
tutes acid mine drainage is required. In underground mining wide
chambers of coal are carved out. The resulting structure of caverns
and tunnels leading to the lower parts of the mine resembles a
honeycomb. After all the coal is removed from one room, it is
sealed off by closing all the underground passageways to it by con-
structing barriers. Groundwater collects in the mines and pools
there; if it is not pumped out, an underground lake may be formed.
Acid mine drainage occurs when pyrite, marcasite, and iron
26. Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834 § 30, 71 P.S. § 510-103. The Act abolished the
Sanitary Water Board and its functions were assumed by the DER.
27. Act of Aug. 23, 1965, § 5, Pa. P.L. 376, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§
691.315(a)-(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989), amending Act of June 22, 1937, Pa. P.L. 1987.
28. Id. § 691.315(i), They are: 1) if it's incompatible with existing State or local land
use plans or programs; 2) affect fragile or historic, cultural, scientific, and esthetic values
and natural systems; 3) affect renewable resource lands in which such operation could result
in substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water supply or of food or fiber
products, and such lands include aquifer recharge areas; or 4) affect natural hazard lands in
which such operation could substantially endanger life and property, such lands to include
areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of unstable geology.
29. Id. § 691.315(m).
1990
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desulfides, found in coal beds, come in contact with air and water.
The result is acid and iron pollutants. The pyrites in the ground
are exposed when coal is mined. Through a chemical reaction, pyri-
tes oxidize to form ferrous sulfate and sulfuric acid, which are
washed into the ground water flowing in the mine. Further hydro-
lyzing or oxidizing occurs and ferric iron is oxidized to the ferric
state with resulting additional acidity. As a result of these chemi-
cal reactions, the receiving streams are loaded with sulfates, acid
and iron hydroxides, along with dissolved minerals. The iron by-
products give the acid mine drainage a reddish color. "Yellow-boy,
a slightly soluble iron hydroxide, precipates out of the stream-
beds." 30
The cost of treatment is very high due to several factors, includ-
ing: the remoteness of the area with its attendant problems of
bringing in electricity and machinery; and the time consuming and
expensive process of limification.
IV. EARLY MODERN CASES: CLEAN STREAMS LAW
CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIES To INACTIVE AND ACTIVE MINES
Two cases arising under the Clean Streams Law, based upon a
similar factual pattern were consolidated for hearing by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court when it granted allocatur.3 The case,
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 2 held that the Sanitary
Water Board could require the operator of an active mine to treat
acid mine drainage that originated in an adjacent inactive mine
along with the drainage generated from working the active mine. 3
Section 315 of the Clean Streams Law was thus upheld as constitu-
tional after withstanding a due process analysis. 4 Secondly, the
30. Broughton, Koza & Selway, Acid Mine Drainage and the Pennsylvania Courts, 11
DuQ. L. REV. 495, 496-97 (1973).
31. Coal Companies filed applications for mine drainage permits. The Sanitary Water
Board denied the permits in the terms proposed by the coal companies. The Sanitary Water
board would issue permits pursuant to certain conditions being met. The coal companies
appealed to the commonwealth court. Harmar Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board, 4 Pa.
Commw. 435, 285 A.2d 898 (1972). Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Sanitary Water Board, 4 Pa.
Commw. 407, 286 A.2d 459 (1972). Consolidated Coal was the operator of the mines
involved.
32. 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 08, reh'g denied (1973). Appeal dismissed for lack of a fed-
eral question. Harmar Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 94 S.Ct. 1395, two cases, 415 U.S. 903, 39
L.Ed.2d 460 (1974).
33. 306 A.2d at 321.
34. Id. The court reasoned: The regulation of the state's water resources were within
the scope of police power. "Reasonableness" is the standard to measure the law. The pre-
sumption of reasonableness is with the state and the question of reasonableness is for the
Vol. 28:757
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court held that the 1970 amendments to the Clean Streams Law
were not being applied retroactively. The Court focused on the
present pumping and discharge of the polluted water into the sur-
face waters, not the past mining operations which contaminated
the underground water. 5
The facts were as follows: The Indianola Mine, an inactive aban-
doned mine was next to the active Harmar Mine.36 A dangerous
level of hydrostatic pressure in the Indianola Mine had to be re-
lieved to prevent the collapse of a barrier separating the two mines
and flooding the Harmar mine. 7 To protect its mining operations,
the company would have to pump 6.48 million gallons per day of
untreated acid mine drainage from Indianola and discharge it into
Deer Creek, a tributary of the Allegheny River.38 Prior to the 1965
amendments, there was no violation of the Clean Streams Law for
mines which followed this mode of operation. In Pittsburgh's
Hutchinson Mine, fugitive mine water 39 flowed from an abandoned
adjacent mine into the deeper active mine.40 Due to gravitational
forces, the ground water present in the sealed abandoned mine ran
into the active mine at the rate of 2.17 million gallons of water per
day.41 In applying for a permit, pursuant to sections 315(a) and
315(b) of the Clean Streams Law, Pittsburgh only would have as-
sumed responsibility of treating the 1.27 million gallons per day
that originated from the Hutchinson mining operation. 42 The Com-
monwealth Court held that if the water did not come from its
mine, the coal company could not be held responsible for its treat-
ment. 3 To hold otherwise would constitute an unreasonable, arbi-
trary and oppressive exercise of the state's police power because it
would deny the coal company the use and enjoyment of its prop-
erty unless it treated the entire discharge. 44 The court below lim-
ited the application of section 315 to discharges from active mines
legislature, not the courts. The court identified clean water as a public concern . It was not
commercially impractical to comply with the law, therefore the court found no hardship by
imposing the cost of pollution control on the profit-making coal companies. 306 A.2d at 316-
17.
35. 306 A.2d at 319.







43. 306 A.2d at 314.
44. Id. at 316.
1990 763
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only, to the "first" discharge of noxious and deleterious substances
into the Commonwealth's water and also held that the moving of
the polluted subsurface water to the surface waters did not come
within the definition of mine drainage or any other of industrial
waste."5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth
Court's restrictive interpretation of the Clean Streams Law.4"
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Jones construed the Clean
Streams Law as applying to both active and inactive mining opera-
tions in accordance with the legislative intent. 7 The Court dis-
missed as nonsense the idea of a "first" discharge into the surface
waters.4" The Court adopted a "but for" analysis to determine cau-
sation: but for the mining operation would there have been any
discharge of polluted water into the surface waters?49 The Su-
preme Court further held that the discharge was industrial waste,
a result of the industrial pursuit of mining.50 The Supreme Court
defined "mine drainage" as waters which have been polluted as a
result of the operation of a mine, including fugitive mine waters. 1
Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of both
the 1965 and 1970 amendments of the Clean Streams Law as it
applied to this case.2
Essentially, the court conducted a due process analysis of the
Clean Streams Law by measuring it against the standards set forth
in Lawton v. Steele.53 The court found a public interest in the con-
45. Id. at 314.
46. Id. The court declared: " We do not agree with the Commonwealth Court's inter-
pretation of the Clean Streams Law in Harmar Coal." 306 A.2d at 314.
47. 306 A.2d at 315.
48. Id. The court stated:
Water polluted underground can itself pollute the surface water into which it is dis-
charged. Nothing in the Clean Streams Law justifies the Court's (Commonwealth)
holding that pollution occurs only when the polluting substances are "first discharged
into any "waters of the Commonwealth,'" in this case the underground pool ...
[T]he critical and principal illegal conduct under the Clean Streams Law is the dis-
charge into the surface waters. The Court below, however, failed to distinguish be-
tween pollution of waters, created by mining, which remain underground and those
waters which are discharged to the surface. In the Clean Streams Law and the Rules
and Regulations thereunder this distinction is crystal clean ... (emphasis in the
original).
452 Pa. at 89-90, 306 A.2d at 315.
49. Id.
50. 306 A.2d at 316.
51. 306 A.2d at 316.
52. 306 A.2d at 316.
53. Id. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, (1984), is quoted in the opinion as propos-
ing the following test:
Vol. 28:757
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trol of acid mine drainage pollution; 4 a reasonable relationship be-
tween the means used to control the drainage and the end result of
clean streams sought by the statute, buttressed by a presumption
of constitutionality and no imposition of undue hardship on Con-
solidated Coal, the owner of the mine.5
Thus, the Harmar decision strengthened the Clean Streams Law
by its determination that the law applied to both inactive as well
as active mines, and that such application was constitutional. The
Supreme Court employed a negligence "but for" analysis to deter-
mine the causation element of nuisance. This test would be ex-
panded in later cases. The court selected the time when the con-
taminated water was released above ground, rather than the earlier
point in time when it was first polluted, to impose liability.
V. How FAR DOES LIABILITY REACH? DOES THE "BUT FOR"
ANALYSIS APPLY TO A CLOSED MINE? How FAR CAN THE DER Go
IN ORDERING CLEAN-UP?
The next case to arise under the Clean Streams Law involved a
situation where acid mine drainage discharge emanated from a
closed mine. In Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,5" the state
through its agent, the DER, brought an equity action to require
the owner to treat the acid mine drainage which was discharging
from his closed mine. The Commonwealth Court found the com-
pany not liable on any of the theories. 7 The DER appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which held the dis-
charge abatable either under a statutory or common law nuisance
theory and remanded to the Commonwealth Court to take addi-
tional evidence and fashion an appropriate decree.58 The Common-
To justify the state . . . interposing its authority in behalf or the public, it must
appear-First, that the interests of the public ... require such interference; and sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Harmar, 306 A.2d at 317 (1973).
54. Id. The court cited Article I, § 27 of Pa. Constitution, P.S., declaring:
Natural resources and the public estate - The people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
55. 306 A.2d 308, 317 (1973).
56. 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974),[hereinafter Barnes & Tucker I].
57. 319 A.2d at 873.
58. Id. The four theories on which the Commonwealth sought relief were:
1990
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wealth Court ordered the mine owner to operate a pumping facility
to prevent future discharge of any untreated acid mine drainage
into the surface waters of the state.5 9 The mine owner then chal-
lenged the constitutionality of that order the Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker 1160 arguing such an order
amounted to a taking without just compensation.
The Barnes and Tucker company operated the Lancashire Mine
No. 15 from 1939 to July 1969, at which time it was closed and
sealed.61 Barnes and Tucker operated under permits granted prior
to 1965 when it was permissible to discharge untreated water into
unclean streams. The company received three one year extensions
of the pre-1965 permits allowing it to continue its operation until
1969.62 After it was plugged, another discharge occurred from the
Mayberry borehole6 3 and some surface breakout occurred.64 These
discharges eventually found their way into the western branch of
the Susquehanna River. 5 By requiring the company to pump out
the water beyond an established level and then treat it prior to its
discharge, the DER sought to prevent future discharges into the
public waters.66 Fugitive mine waters from mines not owned by
Barnes and Tucker accounted for six million gallons of the 7.2 mil-
lion gallons required by the DER to be treated.6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the United States Su-
preme Court case of Lawton v. Steele6 8 in its analysis of the consti-
tutionality of Section 315 of the Clean Streams Law. 9 It did not
consider the percentage ratio when it considered the "takings" ar-
gument and the reasonable exercise of police power. Rather, the
1). a permit violation
2). a violation of $316
3). a statutorily declared public nuisance
4). a common law public nuisance.
319 A.2d at 878.
59. 23 Pa. Commw. 496, 353 A.2d 471 (1976).
60. 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461, appeal dismissed for lack of a federal question, 434
U.S. 807. (1977).





66. 371 A.2d at 464.
67. 371 A.2d at 465.
68. See supra, note 52 for Lawton v. Steele factors.
69. 472 Pa. 115, 123, 371 A.2d 461, 465, appeal dismissed for lack of a federal ques-
tion, 434 U.S. 807, (1977).
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Court focused on the severity of the acid mine drainage problem70
and elaborated on Harmar's "but for" rationale: but for the activ-
ity of mining, the discharge would not have occurred, therefore,
the mining company is enjoinable for abating this public nui-
sance. 71 The Court concluded, apparently after balancing the se-
verity of the harm against the abatement order, that the order was
not an unreasonable exercise of police power. 72 The Court quickly
handled the "takings" argument and noted that the coal company
had failed to produce any evidence that this would impact ad-
versely on their business or present an alternative solution."
Under Barnes and Tucker H, the Clean Streams Law and the
power to enforce it were greatly strengthened. It is hard to imagine
when liability would not attach when the court employs the "but
for" test in a mining situation where there is discharge arising
under section 315. Harmar addressed the present situation when
the water flowed from other inactive mines. Barnes and Tucker H
warned that there would be future liability when, by mining activ-
ity, a public nuisance of acid mine drainage is created even when
the company closes its mine. Although this does adequately ad-
dress the concern that unscrupulous companies will merely close
up a polluting mine and walk away from it to avoid costly clean up,
by focusing on the present situation in these cases, the court can
avoid the ex post facto law argument.
One commentator has suggested a novel approach to challenging
orders such as the one at issue in Barnes and Tucker H, which was
based on the historical policy of promoting the free alienability of
land and the law's antagonism towards perpetuities. 4 Daniel E.
70. 371 A.2d at 465-66. The court stated the acid mine drainage problem had reached
a critical state.
71. 371 A.2d at 466-67. The court quoted the Commonwealth Court's opinion:
Whether the impelling force which produced the public nuisance is solely or partially
that of fugitive mine water flowing into and adding to the generated water of that
mine, the conduct of Barnes & Tucker in its mining activity remains the dominant
and relevant fact without which the public nuisance would not have resulted where
and under the circumstances it did. (Emphasis added).
23 Pa. Commw. at 510, 353 A.2d at 479.
72. 371 A.2d at 467-68.
73. 371 A.2d at 468. The court noted: "The appellant, therefore, has failed to carry its
burden or proof on the issue of unconstitutionality of the remedy imposed." In a recent
case, In re Harmar Coal Co., 378 Pa. Super. 327, 548 A.2d 1224 (1988), Petition for the
allowance of appeal granted 4-17-89, the court determined that the cost of environmental
clean-up efforts involving Clean Streams Law liability is entitled to priority status as an
administrative expense in a state dissolution proceeding over the wage claims of the pension
fund.
74. Daniel E. Rogers, Acid Coal Mine Drainage: The Perpetual Treatment Problem, 1
1990
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Rogers in his article, Acid Coal Mine Drainage: The Perpetual
Treatment Probelm, viewed this order as imposing a "forever" ob-
ligation upon the coal companys by requiring that affirmative acts
be performed involving the exclusive use of the real property of the
company to control pollution for an indefinite period of time. If
the area that has been mined was large enough, he estimated that
the obligation could extend for centuries.7 5 He suggested a chal-
lenge based on the theory that the order would violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 7" First, he interprets the language in the
Pennsylvania Constitution as establishing the state as trustee of all
the natural resources within its borders." By ordering Barnes and
Tucker to clean the waters, the state was transferring its obligation
as trustee for a portion of the environment. The company now had
a legal title to the land with the people of Pennsylvania holding
beneficial title, and the reversionary interest may revert to the
company centuries later. Rogers advanced that the Rule Against
Perpetuities and the creation of any future interest in realty which
would violate the Rule must be held invalid.
VI. SECTION 316: LANDOWNERS AND OCCUPIERS LIABILITY
The first mining case involving section 316 was the 1978 Com-
monwealth Court case, Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Com-
monwealth.7s The issue presented was: Whether a landowner or oc-
cupier could be held liable for a polluting condition which existed
on his land and resulted in pollution of the state's waters when
that polluting condition was created by the past conduct of a for-
mer occupier. After the Environmental Hearing Board79 upheld the
DER order which called for corrective measures to be taken, the
parties appealed to Commonwealth Court.
A chemical, pentachlorophenol, used in the wood preserving bus-
EASTERN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, ANN. 1980 6-1 (1980).
75. Id. at 6-31.
76. Id. He quotes the Rule Against Perpetuities, which provides upon the expiration
of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual
rather than possible events, any interest not then vested... shall be void, from 20 PA. STAT.
ANN. at § 6104.
77. See, Rogers, supra, note 74 at 6-31. See also, note 22, supra, for the constitutional
provision.
78. 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978), aff'd 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).
79. See RANDAL J. BRUBAKER, THE STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN




iness, was identified as the source of the pollution." The court
found that it had been dumped into a disposal well on the prop-
erty, by the previous tenant who was in the wood preservation bus-
iness, but that the dumping had ceased in 1956.81 The chemical
had polluted the groundwater, entered a storm sewer and was dis-
charged into a stream.2
Four parties were joined in the action to challenge the DER cor-
rective order. They were: the landowner and the landlord of the
property continuous since the 1940's, the Rogers; the present ten-
ant, National Wood Preservers; the landowner of a parcel adjacent
to the polluting property; Philadelphia Chewing Gum Company;
and the tenant of that adjacent property, Shell Oil Company. 3 All
were ordered by the DER to take corrective action.
The Commonwealth Court interpreted Section 31684 as applying
to this situation even though the pollution was not the result of a
mining operation. Then, the court construed the statue so it could
be constitutionally applied, explicitly renouncing a strict liability
interpretation.
The court found the legislative intent clearly indicated that Sec-
tion 316 dealt with non-mining activities.8 The legislature by the
1970 amendments broadened the scope of the liability imposed by
the Clean Streams Law. Specifically, with the deletion of the spe-
cific reference to acid mine drainage in policy section four; and sec-
ondly, by empowering the DER to order the landowner to correct
the condition himself and empowering the agency to take action at
an earlier date, upon the appearance of a danger of pollution from
a land condition.
The Commonwealth Court interpreted section 316 as not impos-
ing strict liability, but rather fashioned a two prong test to consti-
tutionally apply the statute. Apparently accepting the appellant's
80. 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142, 145 (1978).
81. 387 A.2d at 146.
82. Id.
83. 387 A.2d at 144.
84. The applicable § 316 (1970 amendments) reads:
Whenever the Sanitary Water Board finds pollution or a danger of pollution is result-
ing from a condition which exists on the land in the Commonwealth, the board may
order the landowner or occupier to correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to
the board or it may order such owner or occupier to allow a mine operator or other
person or agency of the Commonwealth access to the land to take such action. For
purposes of this section, 'landowner' includes any person holding title to or having a
proprietary interest in either surface or subsurface rights.




argument that the plain meaning interpretation of section 316
would be an impermissible unconstitutional regulation because it
imposed liability on an individual merely because he acquired the
status of landowner or occupier, the court announced that owner-
ship alone was an insufficient basis to order clean-up when the pol-
lution was created by another."' The court adopted the theory of
common law liability of one who continues or adopts an existing
nuisance. 7 Thus the court did not interpret section 316 to expand
the statutory liability of the Clean Streams Law beyond that of
common law liability. Liability would attach under the test pro-
posed by the court: 1) If the owner/occupier either permitted or
authorized the creation of the polluting condition on his land, or if
he knew or should have known of the condition on his land, and 2)
associates himself in some positive respect, beyond mere ownership
or occupancy with the condition after its creation."
The court applied this test to the four parties and dismissed the
adjacent landowner, Philadelphia Chewing Gum Company, and the
adjacent tenant, Shell Oil Company. 9 The landowners, the Rogers,
were liable because they should have known about the condition
since they rented the property to industrial tenants and, by col-
lecting rent from the polluters, they affirmatively associated them-
selves with the conduct.90 The tenant, National Wood Preservers,
was held accountable because, it knew of the polluting problem
prior to renting the premises, and it used this knowledge of a po-
tential environmental problem to drive down the price of the busi-
ness it bought.91 The bargain was enough to satisfy the element of
affirmative conduct indicating an adoption of the problem. A re-
duction in selling price due to potential environmental liability
does not extinguish that liability but passes it on to a shrewd
buyer. Furthermore, the seller of the polluted property, if sued by
the buyer, can raise the defense of caveat emptor 2
86. The court stated:
Since we believe that serious constitutional problems arise if the police power of this
commonwealth can be wielded against landowners or occupiers whose ownership or
occupancy bears absolutely no relationship to the polluting condition, we hold that
Environmental Hearing Board committed an error of law in concluding that § 316 is a
declaration of strict liability based upon the mere fact of ownership or occupancy.
387 A.2d at 148.
87. 387 A.2d at 150.
88. Id.
89. 387 A.2d at 150-51.
90. 387 A.2d at 152.
91. 387 A.2d at 151.
92. For a case dealing with this situation, See Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules,
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The court also disposed of the ex post facto claim in the same
manner as the Harmar and Barnes and Tucker I courts had han-
dled that issue: the court declared it was not past conduct that was
being punished, but a present condition being abated.93 Thus, by
focusing on the present situation rather than the past acts which
caused the pollution, the court easily avoided the charge of retro-
active enforcement. However, unlike the mining cases, the court in
Philadelphia Chewing Gum could not rely on a "but for" analysis
to supply the element of causation on a public nuisance charge.
In 1980, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard the case of Na-
tional Wood Preservers v. Commonwealth."' The Court affirmed
the Commonwealth Court's opinion that section 316 applied to
non-mining pollution. 5 The Court declared that the police power
of the state "is the state's least limitable power." 96 Next, the Court
reviewed the lower court's application of the Lawton test to the
facts of this case. The court found the law to be in the public's
interest; 97 and the means were reasonably necessary to achieve the
result of clean waters.98 The Court focused on the third prong of
the Lawton test, the requirement that the means of the regulation
not be "unduly oppressive upon an individual."99 The Court
adopted the Penn Central °° test which analyzed the economic im-
pact of the regulation of the property holder and, the character of
the governmental action. The Court sidestepped the status argu-
ment as not being an issue based on the Environmental Hearing
Board findings of fact.10' The Court also intimated that fault was
not a prerequisite to liability under a water pollution statute. e'
The court cited the United States Supreme Court cases Penn Cen-
tral and Miller v. Schoene for upholding the position that the
762 F.2d 303 (1985), reversing the U.S. District Court 587 F. Supp. 144 (1984), discussed
infra.
93. 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142, 152 (1978).
94. 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803, 101 S.Ct. 48, 66
L.Ed.2d 7 (1980).
95. 414 A.2d at 42.
96. 414 A.2d at 43.
97. 414 A.2d at 44.
98. 414 A.2d at 45.
99. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, (1978), quoted in
the opinion at 236-37, 414 A.2d at 45.
100. 414 A.2d at 45.
101. 414 A.2d at 46.
102. Id. The court stated that the "validity of an exercise of police power over land
depends little upon the owner or occupier's responsiblity for causing the condition giving
rise to the regulation." 414 A.2d at 46.
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state did not have to show that the property owner caused the con-
dition being regulated to occur. 03 The court concluded its opinion
by stating the appellants failed to carry their burden of persuasion
that the state had exercised its police power unconstitutionally. °4
Justice Flaherty, who concurred in result only, rejected the ma-
jority's reliance on the two United States Supreme Court cases and
revived the Philadelphia Chewing Gum rationale of liability based
on a continuing nuisance theory.10 5 Justice Flaherty reiterated that
obligations placed on property by the state must relate to a use of
that property and not to the mere act of ownership of the prop-
erty. The Justice rejected the strict liability interpretation of sec-
tion 316 as an unconstitutional taking.106 An appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was dismissed.
10 7
In a recent Commonwealth Court case, McIntire Coal Co. v.
Commonwealth,'0 ° the court invoked section 316 as establishing li-
ability, but quoted Justice Flaherty's concurring opinion to inter-
pret this section. 10 9 McIntire involved a situation in which an oper-
ator of strip mines was held liable for the clean-up of the acid mine
drainage emanating from the previous deep mines located on the
property. The court found that liability would attach under either
section 315 or 316. Under section 315, the strip mining operator
violated several conditions of his permit, which imposed the obli-
gation to treat the pre-existing discharge.1 By violating the condi-
tions of the permit, the court held that the McIntires increased the
103. Id.
104. The Court summarily concludes:
In light of Penn Central, Miller and the other cases cited, appellants have failed to
persuade us that the Commonwealth exercised its police powers.
414 A.2d at 47.
105. 414 A.2d at 47-48 where he quotes at length the Philadelphia Chewing Gum
opinion.
106. Justice Flaherty concludes:
Where society requires, the property of another can be taken, but only with due com-
pensation. To construe the subject Act as providing for strict liability, based on noth-
ing more than the ownership or occupation of land, would be to impose on innocent
individuals the burden which should be borne by society as a whole, thus an uncon-
stitutional taking (emphasis in the original).
414 A.2d at 48.
107. See supra, note 74.
108. 108 Pa. Commw. 443, 530 A.2d 140, rehearing denied (1987).
109. The court states, in discussing § 316 liability:
However, before liability will attach, it must be shown that the owner or occupier
knew of the polluting conditions and positively associated with it by engaging in some
affirmative conduct, indicating an intent to adopt the condition.
530 A.2d at 144.
110. 530 A.2d at 142-43.
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potential for acid mine drainage to develop.'11 Under section 316,
the McIntires were liable on a continuing nuisance theory. They
knew of the previous polluted condition and positively associated
themselves with it by some affirmative conduct, which indicated
their intent to adopt it. The court did not state what this affirma-
tive action was, but under Philadelphia Chewing Gum, the
purchase of the land would have qualified.
After McIntire, the state could impose liability based on either
section 315 or 316. In another 1987 case, Commonwealth v. PBS
Coal Co.," 2 the Commonwealth Court expressly declared fault not
to be a prerequisite to section 315 liability.
PBS Coal involved the contamination of the well water of seven
homes and a dairy farm in a mining region by acid mine drainage.
The lower court held two mining companies jointly and severally
liable for the damage. The company appealed to the Common-
wealth Court with the following tautology: The court imposed joint
and several liability which implies tortious conduct, tortious con-
duct implies an element of culpability, and because the state failed
to prove fault the judgement must be reversed. The court dis-
missed this contention by stating the conduct, creation or mainte-
nance of a statutorily-declared public nuisance, was declared un-
lawful and against public policy. The court concluded, "Fault,
thus, is irrelevant for purposes of the statutory declaration that the
conduct is unlawful.""' 3 The court in this case did not apply the
"but for" test to supply the element of causation.
VII. FEDERAL DECISIONS
CAN A BUYER OF A POLLUTED SITE, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY INCURS
SUBSTANTIAL CLEAN-UP COSTS, RECOVER AGAINST THE SELLER?
To appreciate the impact of Clean Streams Law liability, and
the power the DER has to order the clean-up of polluting condi-
tions, the third circuit decision of Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Hercules"4 (hereinafter PECO) is illustrative. The facts in this
case are as follows: PECO operated a hydrocarbon resin manufac-
turing plant on its property abutting an inlet on the Delaware
River."15 It closed off the inlet and created a pond in which it bur-
111. 530 A.2d at 143.
112. 112 Pa. Commw. 1, 534 A.2d 1130 (1987), reh'g denied (1988), in 551 A.2d 217.
113. 534 A.2d at 1140.
114. 162 F.2d 303 (1985) reversing the U.S. District Court 5876 F. Supp. 144 (1984).
115. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, 762 F.2d 303 (1985) reversing the U.S. Dis-
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ied its resin waters.'16 In 1971, PECO sold its property to Gould,
who leased certain tanks on the site to a waste water disposal ser-
vice. PECO was at all times the next door neighbor to these activi-
ties. In 1973, PECO bought an option from Gould to buy this site
even though it had learned by inspecting the site that the waste
disposal company was a "sloppy tenant.""' 7 In 1974, the waste dis-
posal company vacated the property, although it had not finished
cleaning up several oil spills in the pond." 8 PECO exercised its
option to buy the land and has owned the property subse-
quently." 9 Its only activity on the land was to lease a portion to
the American Refinery Group.
1 20
After a 1980 inspection of the site which found resinous materi-
als to be leaching into the Delaware River, the DER ordered PECO
to clean up the site pursuant to section 316.121 PECO complied. In
February, 1981, the resinous leaching was found again and in May,
the DER again ordered PECO to clean up the site. 22 In February,
1982, PECO instituted suit against the former site owner, Gould,
and the corporate successor of PECO, Hercules, on the theories of
private nuisance and public nuisance.12  The court dismissed
Gould from the proceedings upon a finding of no wrongdoing. 24
The jury found damages for PECO in the amount of
$394,910.14.125 Hercules appealed. Hercules, after having been
found to be liable as the corporate successor of PICCO on a de
facto merger theory and an express assumption of liability in the
merger agreement, raised the defense of caveat emptor. 16 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed this
defense was properly raised. The court found that PECO had no
trict Court 587 F.Supp. 144 (1984).






122. Id. at 307.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 308.
126. See Smith Land & Imp. Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988), for a
contrasting federal view. There the court declared the doctrine of caveat emptor was not
available as a defense to an action brought buyer under CERCLA against the corporate
successors of a manufacturer of asbestos seeking contribution for clean up costs, despite the
buyer's inspection of the site and knowledge of possible environmental clean up costs to be




cause of action on a private nuisance theory for conditions existing
on the land transferred.'27 The court noted that private nuisance
actions are instituted to resolve conflicts between neighboring con-
temporaneous land uses. 2 ' Here, the same property was involved
and the land use sued upon was a prior land use. The court, em-
ploying the Calibreasan risk shifting analysis that had been used in
Philadelphia Chewing Gum, reasoned that because PECO got a
good deal on the land, or at least should have gotten a reduction in
the purchase price it should be barred from what would amount to
a double recovery (reduction in the purchase price and recovery
from the former owner for clean-up costs).12 9 On its second theory
of shifting the liability back to the prior owner, the court held that
PECO lacked standing to sue on a public nuisance theory because
it failed to show a "particular damage" which would permit recov-
ery. 3' Furthermore, PECO lost on its indemnification argument.
The court stated that there was no final adjudication of the actual
legal liability incurred by PECO for its violation of the Clean
Streams Law, therefore an award of damages could not be upheld.
The court noted that PECO had had the opportunity to protect
itself through inspection of the site and negotiation of the terms of
purchase.131 PECO/Hercules was not completely absolved of all lia-
bility. In a footnote, the court pointed out that it did not discharge
PECO from the possible future state or federal action for statutory
nuisance or on a public nuisance charge.132
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Clean Streams Law establishes a comprehensive program
for dealing with water pollution through its permit scheme under
section 315 and the landowner or occupier liability section, section
316. The underlying policy is to shift the clean-up costs to a re-
sponsible party and off the shoulders of the taxpayers. The courts
and legislature have a rather liberal standard for determination of
who is a responsible party, as indicated by the National Wood ma-
jority opinion and Philadelphia Electric Co., and through a plain
127. Id. at 312.
128. Id. at 314.
129. The court states: "We find it inconceivable that the price it (PECO) offered
Gould did not reflect the possibility of environmental risks, even if the exact condition giv-
ing rise to this suit was not discovered." Id.
130. Id. at 316.
131. Id. at 317-318.
132. Id. at 318,n. 20.
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meaning reading of section 316. The permit requirement of section
315 and the penalties imposed for violation can lead to harsh re-
sults as seen in Barnes and Tucker II for the coal company.
The practical problem raised by the Clean Streams Law is: How
far do you have to go to satisfy the duty of inspection? Environ-
mental audits should be undertaken prior to purchasing any indus-
trial property. Mining companies, too, must be careful in acquiring
new areas to mine. They should calculate into the purchase price
the amount of acid mine drainage already existing and the amount
it will increase once their operations begin. The inspection cost
prior to buying property has risen dramatically for mining compa-
nies and industrial buyers. Another way to guard against incurring
high clean up costs is to buy an insurance policy that covers envi-
ronmental problems.
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